policy took precedence in the past, the dominating idea today is that a government's fi scal policy should smooth economic fl uctuations and at the same time contribute to sustainable development. 1 This paradigm shift can be seen in the budget fi gures of communes and cantons, but it is above all evident at the national level. In the past, the Swiss federal budget tended to display an economically asymmetric pattern in which the defi cits accumulated during recessions were not compensated by corresponding surpluses while the economy was booming. 2 The result was a permanent rise in public debt, which increased from CHF 11 billion in 1970 to CHF 108 billion in 2000. Over the same period, the federal debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 11.6 per cent to almost 26 per cent.
3 A large share of this greater debt was used to fi nance accumulated defi cits or to restructure old debts in the second half of the 1990s, for example those stemming from the renovation and refi nancing of the Swiss national railway. 4 The introduction of the debt brake in 2003 marked a transformation in Swiss fi scal policy, the core element of which became the aim of maintaining a balance between sustainability and economic support. This turning point can be seen particularly in the primacy of the passive anti-cyclical stability policy, in which automatic stabilisers are given precedence over active anti-cyclical At the end of 2014, public debt in the euro area amounted to nearly 95 per cent of its GDP. The level of public debt in Germany at the same time was 75 per cent of GDP. Switzerland, by contrast, had a debt-to-GDP ratio of just 35 per cent, a fi gure that had steadily fallen despite the global economic and fi nancial crisis. The country's sinking national debt contributed decisively to this development.
It therefore comes as little surprise that the Swiss debt brake, which in 2013 had been in place for ten years, has been met with considerable interest abroad and served as a model for the German debt brake. By stipulating that the federal budget must be balanced, however, the Swiss debt brake is signifi cantly more restrictive than the German one, which permits a structural defi cit of 0.35 per cent of the GDP. In addition, the compensation account in Switzerland permits economic output-related defi cits on only about half the scale allowed by the corresponding German one. The aim of this article is to compare the regulations in Switzerland and in Germany. While fi scal limitations in the form of debt brakes and financial referenda have been in place at the canton level in Switzerland for some time now, a debt brake for the Confederation was only proposed in 2000. 10 In the referendum held on 2 December 2001, the debt brake for the Confederation was accepted by 85 per cent of voters. It thus replaced the interim provision for the 2001 budget target at the constitutional level (Article 126 of the Federal Constitution). The debt brake was fi rst applied in the 2003 budget. Contrary to original assumptions, however, the debt brake was not introduced on the basis of a structurally balanced budget, which is why additional debt relief programmes were adopted.
The Swiss debt brake
11 With the 2003 debt relief programme, the Swiss Parliament approved cuts totalling around CHF 6 billion. Relief measures on the expenditure side had a considerable effect on the six major task areas of the Confederation: social welfare, transport, national defence, education and basic research, agriculture, and foreign relations. 12 In addition, the 2004 relief programme for the federal budget, which also signifi cantly affected the expenditure side, was adopted.
13
Goals of the debt brake "In the debt brake, the Confederation has introduced a tool whose goal is to connect matters of economic sustainability […] with anti-cyclical fi scal policy."
14 Accordingly, two specifi c goals of the debt brake can be identifi ed: 15 • The short-term goal consists of smoothing economic fl uctuations. With surpluses being formed while the economy is booming and defi cits being allowed to accumulate during recessions, fi scal policy is prevented from becoming pro-cyclical. Instead, the debt brake interventions. 5 This ensures that the automatic stabilisers can take full effect. By contrast, discretionary measures deviating from the basic rule of the debt brake are limited to exceptional cases in accordance with Article 15 of the Swiss Financial Budget Act and the provisions of the supplementation rule. During the recent economic crisis, a progressive procedure was also chosen for the governmental economic programmes, and great reliance was placed on fi scal policy measures. 6 In 2014 the debt ratio of public budgets in Switzerland was below 35 per cent -signifi cantly lower than the Maastricht debt ceiling of 60 per cent. Since 2003, when the ratio of gross debt to GDP in Switzerland was just under 54 per cent, the debt ratio has been continuously reduced (see Figure 1) . 7 The prediction is that it will be further reduced to around 29 per cent by 2018, 8 since the debt reduction trend is expected to continue in all sectors. 9 This welcome reversal in the development of Switzerland's public fi nances is particularly refl ected in the fed- 
